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the Register
This page considers the Access Card Register.
It covers -
introduction
The Human Services (Advanced Service Delivery) Bill
2007 provides for establishment of an electronic
national Register as the basis for the government services
Access Card.
The Register will be established and maintained by the
Secretary of the Department of Human Services.
It will be separate from databases maintained by federal
agencies such as Centrelink, Medicare Australia, the Department
of Veterans' Affairs and other Human Services agencies.
It will also be separate to various taxation, corporate
registration and law enforcement databases.
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that
there
will be no centralised database holding all of an individual’s
information in one place. Existing agency records will
remain with the relevant agency - where they are
now.
Given
the emergence of networks and data mining capabilities
since the Australia Card was proposed the absence of a
single central database is underwhelming, as agencies
will of course be able to rely on their own systems and
will not need a central data processing point (particularly
one that would crimp the various bureaucratic fiefdoms).
The Explanatory Memorandum thus indicates that
information
in the Register will be verified and will be able to
be checked against cards that are presented by individuals
when they claim benefits or seek services. This will
be a significant check against attempts by individuals
to fraudulently obtain benefits.
coverage
Information on the Register will include -
- name
(including prenominals such as 'Dr' or 'Ms' and Australian
honours)
- date
of birth
- citizenship
or residency
- Indigenous
status
- registration
status
- for
people with access cards (ie most Australians)
(a) the access card number;
(b) the date the card was issued;
(c) the expiry date of the card;
(d) if there is a personal identification number for
the card - that number, protected by encryption
or other technological protection measure;
(e) if there is other information (for example, a password)
for authenticating identity - that information,
protected by encryption or other technological protection
measure;
(f) if the individual's photograph is on the surface
of the access card - that photograph and a numerical template
derived from that photograph;
(g) if a digitised signature is on the surface of the
card - that signature;
(h) if the card has expired, or is deactivated, suspended
or cancelled - that fact
(i) the colour of any benefit card held by the individual
(j) if the date of birth is on the surface of the access
card - that fact
(k) if the word 'Blind' is on the surface of the access
card - that fact
- Department
of Veteran's Affairs information, eg identification
of the individual as a former Prisoner of War
- documents
produced to prove identity
- statements
required by legislation, eg a privacy statement
- a
flag identifying a relationship with any of the participating
agencies
- emergency
payment number
- date
of death
- "other
information" -
(a) such other technical or administrative information
that: (i) does not expressly identify the individualby
name or other personal identifiers; and (ii) is determined
by the Secretary; and (iii) is reasonably necessary
for the administration of the Register or the access
card - for example audit logs or the serial number of
the chip
(b) such other information that is determined, by legislative
instrument, by the Minister and that is for the purposes
of this Act.
registration
The proposed legislation envisages that individuals will
formally apply for an access card, with that application
being be made at a variety of venues throughout Australia,
including Medicare offices. (An individual may apply for
registration on behalf of another person, for example
carers on behalf of those they care for.)
Applicants will be required to provide documents or information
that establishes the individual's "identity and use
of that identity in the community". Those documents
will be specified by the government and are expected to
include "birth certificates, passports, immigration
documents, drivers' licences and similar documents".
The legislation seeks to address instances where some
individuals (eg some Indigenous people in remote Australia,
homeless persons and "people at risk" such as
participants in the national witness
protection program) are unable to provide the requisite
documentation.
Given that a rationale of the Access Card scheme is substantial
reduction in fraudulent access to government services
- and an essential weakness of the scheme is fraudulent
enrolment - verification processes (as yet not described
but presumably consistent with identity referencing mechanisms
discussed here) will be
used to "ensure that forged or duplicate documents
are not used to fraudulently register people".
Individuals wanting an access card will need to attend
an interview have their photograph taken and provide a
signature. The expectation is that at the interview Commonwealth
officials will physically sight the applicant, "discuss"
documents provided by the individual and take a digital
photograph for inclusion on the Register and card.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2007 Bill notes
that there may be instances where it would be inappropriate
for an individual to attend an interview or have a photograph
taken (eg where a person is physically incapable or "where
it would be emotionally upsetting" for a severely
disfigured person to have to submit to a photograph).
Similar considerations apply to the requirement to provide
a signature.
Given the large number of people to be enrolled on the
Register the "interview" in most cases is likely
to be somewhat cursory and mechanistic. Few government
staff have extensive skills in document forensics: the
verification will presumably centre on online identity
referencing (ie matching information from birth certificates
and other documents with the relevant databases). The
verification will presumably identify some bogus documentation.
Some fraud will slip through, whether through the systematic
nature of impersonation or through dealings with corrupt
officials.
As noted earlier
in this profile, some individuals will seek to manufacture
their own cards and in particular circumstances - notably
where the fake card is being used as a proof of identity
document in private sector transactions - that forgery
will be effective.
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