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section heading icon     private equity

This page considers private equity funding.

It covers -

It is supplemented by a detailed note that explores the shape of private equity funds, discusses the origins of their capital, profiles fund managers such as Apax and KKR, and highlights landmarks in the history of the private equity sector.

     introduction

Definitions of private equity (PE) are contentious and reports often conflate statistics regarding 'acquisition funds', hedge funds, realty funds, venture capital and even angel funding.

That conflation reflects genuine disagreement, advocacy (larger figures can for example be more persuasive in lobbying regulators or impressing journalists) and blurring of some boundaries (with some financial institutions now operating hedge, PE and other funds).

It also reflects the rebadging of the leveraged buyout (LBO) industry since the late 1980s, with entities such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) now promoted as private equity fund managers rather than creators of 'junk bonds'.

For the purposes of this page and the associated more detailed note, a private equity fund is taken to involve a pool of capital that is typically -

  • handled by a specialist equity fund manager (sometimes an offshoot of a traditional investment bank)
  • provided by a small number of participants, including pension funds, banks, endowments and wealthy individuals
  • used for the acquisition of an existing enterprise (a corporation or discrete business unit within an enterprise) or other asset (for example a highway, a pipeline or a chain of broadcasting towers).

The expectation is that participants in the fund, and the fund managers, will be rewarded through disposal of the assets within one to seven years. That disposal may involve floating the asset on a stock exchange, selling the asset to an enterprise or selling it to another private equity fund.

A fund - or consortium of funds - might thus buy all shares in a corporation that hitherto had a large number of shareholders and was traded on a stock exchange. Dividends from that acquisition would allow the fund to recoup some or even all of the capital used in the takeover. The fund would then unload the acquisition for a substantial. The internal rate of return on capital is often greater than 100%, making participation attractive to entities with the necessary resources. Those entities include banks, insurers, pension funds, wealthy individuals, endowed universities, museums and hospitals.

Although there is substantial churn of assets - industry journals and associations have recurrently awarded 'deal of the year' or 'manager of the year' labels for acquisition and disposal of an entity within 12 or 18 months - most participants in funds are committed to remain with that fund for a longer period, often for ten years.

Most private equity funds are concerned with acquisition and disposal of existing assets, in contrast to venture capital funding of new enterprises and innovation. Their activity also contrasts with the often frenetic trading of hedge funds, which exploit shorter term arbitrage of currency, financial derivatives and other assets.

Unsurprisingly, they have been assailed as an embodiment of 'short-termism' (concerned only with devouring and disgorging their targets within a few years, with little heed to ongoing development), ruthless asset strippers that flip debt-ridden carcases to naive 'mum & dad' investors, or simply as "locusts" from another jurisdiction.

Defenders have responded that PE activity benefits both those who sell assets and those who participate in funds, encourages best use of resources, provides an incentive for managers, unfreezes stagnant capital or simply reflects the restlessness of capital (and the ingenuity of its custodians) in global markets.

     leverage

Acquisition often involves the assumption of substantial debt by the fund or the acquired entity. That debt may be in the form of bonds, preference shares or loans from a financial institution such as a bank.

It is best known for management buyouts (MBOs), in which an organisation's senior executives gain the support of a financial services specialist to buy some/all of that enterprise. Ownership of that enterprise is then shared by the managers and their financiers, with the expectation that the enterprise's performance will be sufficiently improved to allow repayment of debt and/or a financially advantageous exit for those participants in the acquisition.

Debt in such a leveraged buy out (LBO) is usually significantly higher than equity, with risk accordingly being reflected in loan payments that have a higher rate of interest than standard and characterisation of bonds as 'below investment-grade' (aka junk bonds), similarly offering higher yields to offset the possibility that lenders may not recoup their capital.

Private equity schemes in particular markets have become increasingly sophisticated over the past thirty years, with investors often being able to participate in an LBO through purchase of debt (acquisition of bonds or participation in a bank loan) or through via a private equity fund operated by a specialist manager. Some investors have been individuals - particularly those with substantial income/assets - but typically most support has come from pension funds, insurance companies, banks and institutions with diverse investment portfolios. (A discussion of their involvement is here.)

Leveraged financing in Australia, the US, UK and other jurisdictions over the past three decades has been hailed as unlocking substantial returns for investors and more broadly for driving improvement in the performance of individual enterprises and markets.

It has, however, been criticised as a form of 'casino capitalism', with abuse by junk bond vendors, manipulation of the tax system, demise of debt-burdened enterprises, destruction of communities as managers slashed operations to satisfy the demands of their lenders and failure to invest in innovation (or even maintenance) because of that debt.

Critics have pointed to concurrent erosion of regulation and ready access to junk finance as resulting in the dismemberment of particular enterprises, the creation of unwieldy debt-fuelled enterprises such as Primedia and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few financiers in ways that are reminiscent of the 1870s-1890s.

Others have questioned claims about the effectiveness of some funds. That questioning has included scepticism about rewards for some managers, which typically seek to extract substantial fees at every stage (eg advising on initial acquisition by a fund, sale of the assets to a trust, underwriting subsequent float of the acquired enterprise and even continuing management). One contact mordantly commented that the fund manager - like a casino operator - never loses, in contrast to the punter or some of those who invest in a fund.

It has also featured scepticism about the affinity between some managers and the acquisition, particularly the preparedness to invest in longterm growth or merely to ride out bad times. That is particularly the case in the media sector, where some funds clearly paid too much for assets and then managed them indifferently amid a concentration on cutting costs to fund debt and to spritz up an enterprise for early sale.

     shape

Private equity transactions essentially take three forms -

  • those in which a public company is taken private, through an LBO, MBO or management buy in (MBI)
  • divestitures that result from selling off units of a public or private company to a private equity fund
  • private market transactions involving companies whose stocks are not publicly traded.

As with venture capital, discussed later in this guide, those transactions centre on profitable exits for investors.

Possible exit strategies for private equity investors include -

  • an initial public offering (IPO), which allows investors to liquidate some or all of their interest in the particular entity when it becomes a public company
  • recapitalisation, which allows equity holders to realize a return by taking a sizable dividend
  • outright or partial sale to another buyer, which in some instances is another private equity fund.

The landmarks here illustrate acquisitions by private equity funds and subsequent listing on exchanges, sale to corporations or disposal to other PE funds.

    
the industry

Contemporary private equity funds trace their origins to investment banking at the turn of last century and beyond, in which a handful of well-connected (or merely aggressive) partnerships such as Morgan, Drexel and Peabody acquired enterprises - often from individual owners or families - and then recouped the cost of acquisition by issuing shares or bonds.

That activity might be on a very large scale (for example creation of US Steel and International Mercantile Marine under the auspices of JP Morgan) and might involve substantial international investment. Those responsible for such deals often retained substantial control of the enterprises through corporate directorships, made money through a range of fees, enjoyed privileged access to information and frequently retained equity on a preferential basis.

Financial deregulation in the US during the 1970s and 1980s, reversing restrictions imposed earlier in the century (particularly after demonstration of egregious abuses during inquiries under FDR), resulted in a wave of corporate takeovers funded by junk bonds. Contrary to some of the more hagiographic accounts, vendors and buyers of those bonds often acted as a herd. Typically vendors contributed around 10% of the acquisition price, with the remaining percentage comprising bonds or bank debt. That leverage - or merely poor assessment of risk as competitors chased increasingly weaker opportunities - resulted in difficulties after the 1987 crash. Of the 41 US$100m+ LBOs between 1980 and 1984, only one defaulted on its debt by 1992. In contrast, over 30 of 86 large buyouts between 1985 and 1989 defaulted (with 18 going into bankruptcy) by 1992.

     regulation

Private equity funds are lightly regulated, particularly in contrast with entities such as mutual funds.

The lightness of touch reflects the nature of participation: investors in private equity funds are institutional investors and wealthy families/individuals, rather than 'unsophisticated' retail investors. It also reflects the shape of investment: PE funds typically acquire infrastructure or whole enterprise, which are then run as private companies and thus attract less scrutiny by corporate regulators, particularly when investment is made across borders. In 2006 the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) released a discussion paper (PDF) arguing that although the major funds and their lenders require closer surveillance they do not pose a broad risk to the overall financial system.

In practice the primary regulation facing private equity funds concerns -

  • competition policy, eg a particular fund would be unlikely to gain permission from the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission to acquire all the nation's airlines or all the major pathology chains
  • terms on which entities are acquired and subsequently floated, in particular adequate disclosure during the IPO process
  • the same compliance with taxation regimes facing limited partnerships or corporations.

Low regulation has reinforced the secrecy with which PE funds and managers shroud their activity. Arguably it has encouraged movement by institutional investors to assign capital
to those funds. Managers appear to justify weak disclosure to their institutional participants as necessitated by their operation and consistent with practice across the industry. Corporate governance is thus a concern and restrictive covenants (ie contractual requirements binding managers and investors) are particularly important.

     Australia

Private equity funds have been increasingly active in Australia, with acquisition of landmark enterprises such as the Myer department store chain, Affinity Healthcare group, specialist retailers Repco and Just Group, consumer products group Pacific Brands and half of PBL's media interests (broadcasting and publishing).

That activity reflects the nation's investment culture (eg more receptive to PE funds than Germany and "speaking American"), deregulation, economic and political stability, perceptions that acquisitions are affordable and expectations that assets can be unloaded fairly quickly.

Much of the dealmaking has involved overseas entities, whether directly or through local offshoots. However, domestic fund managers have emerged in emulation of their peers and in recognition of the availability of local capital as a result of changes to the Australian superannuation (pension) regime. In 2006 the superannuation sector had assets of over $600 billion, reinvesting some 14% per year. One industry figure commented that "is a lot of money to invest ... you can't forever be buying and selling BHP shares to each other".

Some PE fund managers have accordingly directed their attention offshore, with an often aggressive drive to acquire overseas enterprises such as the London Stock Exchange in addition to facilities such as tollways and airports in Europe, North America and Asia.

The Australian private equity fund sector - as an importer and exporter of capital - is discussed in more detail here.

     studies

There is a large technical literature on private equity fund management and assessment, much of it directed at practitioners or fund participants. Broader literature on the shape of the industry, regulatory concerns and impacts is however disappointingly thin.

Popular writing about particular funds such as KKR and Carlyle tends to be unduly favourable or critical, with an emphasis on anecdote and little effort to analyse marketing statements by some managers.

Pointers to work on particular private equity funds, the economics and regulation of LBOs, and fund managers as a target for cultural criticism are provided elsewhere on this site.

     media sector

We have a particular interest in the acquisition, aggregation, disassembly and sale of media groups
by private equity funds.

Some of those deals - notably KKR's Primedia - have turned out to be dogs. Others have attracted attention because of their size or because of competition policy concerns. They include aggregation of parts of Kluwer with BertelsmannSpringer to form a dominant scientific publisher, the spin off of Warner Music, takeover of MGM, spin off of the Packer print and broadcast interests, US$13.7bn takeover of Univision and US$9.7bn takeover of VNU.

Salient media industry deals are highlighted here. A broader chronology of private equity sales and acquisitions is provided elsewhere on this site

Snapshots of major funds such as Apax, Cinven, Candover, KKR, Texas Pacific, Blackstone and Providence Equity are here.




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version of October 2006
© Bruce Arnold