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section heading icon     issues

This page considers questions of privacy, security and identity in relation to passports.

It covers -

section marker icon     introduction

Passports, visas and similar travel documents involve three overlapping questions -

  • provenance, sometimes characterised as its 'authenticity'
  • certitude - is it borne by the person whose information features in the document
  • context, what other information available or needed for interpretation of the document

Ultimately any passport - likely other identity documents - is only as good as the checking, whether at the time of issue, time of presentation (eg while crossing a border) or otherwise (eg during a detailed forensic examination once authenticity has been called into question).

Its value for governments and other bodies involves perceptions of risk. It also involves tradeoffs. The impact of tradeoffs between free movement and security for example potentially include undue delays, administrative costs, erosion of privacy and reinforcement of ethnic or other stereotypes.

section marker icon     provenance

Questions of provenance centre on
the document's authenticity, including differentiation between the legitimacy of the physical format - paper, ink, cardboard and gold foil - and the status of information embodied in that document.

Was it issued by a government agency? Is it a forgery that has the same appearance and other characteristics of an official document?

More subtly, is the physical entity legitimate but the content illicit. Some criminals have recognised, for example, that there is no need to manufacture a passport from scratch when they can use a stolen 'blank' or simply buy a passport with the details of their choice from a corrupt official.

Estimates of the scale of fraud - and extent of its detection - are contentious. However, in 2003 the government of Papua New Guinea announced the theft of that nation's passport database (along with computer backups and blank passports), with the French government revealing in 2004 that some 10,000 blank French passports, 5,000 blank French driver's licenses, 10,000 blank car ownership certificates and 1,000 international driver's licenses without any identification numbers had disappeared. In 2008 the UK Identity & Passport Service announced theft of 3,000 blank passports, along with the van carrying them.

Questions of provenance also encompass recognition of the government that issued the document and more broadly acceptance that the document has an official status.

As we noted on the preceding page of this note, while all animals in the international community are ostensibly equal, some of less equal than others. Particular states have chosen not to recognise the existence of some others (notably non-recognition of Israel and therefore its passports)
or Many law-abiding seafarers were detained for up to two weeks after Sept. 11, either on shore or aboard docked ships. During a time of extraordinary security precautions, some officials were “reluctant to recognize IDs issued by foreign governments,” Dani Apave, senior maritime specialist at the ILO, said at the recent

Anti-forgery technologies to defend the integrity of documents

section marker icon     certitude

Bearer - essentially does it indicate the person’s true identity. Dual citizenship. Japanese swap, cooked details to get legit document
People are not good at facial recognition or accurately identifying other biometrics such as height (hich, importantly, aren’t unique)

section marker icon     technologies of authentication

From a technological perspective passports have followed the same trajectory as other key identification documents, with a movement from handwritten script on paper, adoption of anti-forgery mechanisms (from watermarks through security threads and intaglio printing to lamination, holograms and laser perforation), inclusion of photographs and OCR text, and contemporary incorporation of RFID tags.

Changes have been incremental. In appearance the passports of most nations are very similar to those created in 1914 or 1920, replete with insignia, curlicues and gold leaf. The Australian Passports Office thus boasts that in 1999-2000 production required 69,000 metres of gold foil, 1,100 litres of glue and 95,500 metres of thread.

In 2004 Barry Steinhardt of the ACLU warned that biometric passports will - 

  • become gold standard of identity verification around the world
  • become template for domestic National ID systems
  • increasingly be demanded for more and more purposes, abroad and domestically
  • be subject to private sector 'piggybacking'

He concluded that "expansion is inevitable"





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version of January 2005
© Bruce Arnold
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