Caslon Analytics elephant logo title for Sedition note
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section heading icon     online

This page considers treatment of online sedition, including postings in newsgroups, personal blogs and sites maintained by advocacy organisations.

It covers -

subsection heading icon     introduction

The preceding pages of this note have indicated that concern about seditious expression has embraced speech, print, graphic arts (including comics and posters), film and radio/television broadcasts. The characterisation of 'sedition' - and responses to it - vary from state to state and by epoch, with most jurisdictions exhibiting cycles of anxiety, repression and relaxation regarding supposed/substantive external and internal threats.

In Australia for example there have recurrent calls for special sedition legislation and prosecutions regarding successive menaces such as fenians (1860s-1921), anarchists (1890s-1925) and communists (1917-1950s). For many people such action now has a distinctly antiquarian flavour. Other states have actively sought to restrict what many Australians would consider to be legitimate - or merely harmless - criticism, with little differentiation between those who advocate the violent overthrow of the regime and those who question a lack of choice in political representation.

Responses to online seditious activity in liberal democratic states such as Australia are complicated by perceptions that the net embodies free speech and is (or should be) freer than offline.

They are also complicated by perceptions that government agencies - or surrogates such as ISPs - cannot effectively police online publishing and messaging (expectations that we have questioned elsewhere on this site). Rationales for that belief are that -

  • the net is "too big and too fluid" for meaningful identification and prosecution of offences
  • authorities are 'illiterate' (eg lack the requisite IT skills or are not conversant with languages such as Arabic, Sinhalese or Serbian)
  • authorities prefer to concentrate on "traditional technologies", whether because of personal/institutional affinity or because traditional methods produce better results
  • technologies enable true anonymity or effective pseudonymity

Most states have chosen to treat online activity as part of broader sedition enactments, offences in an existing criminal code or provisions in telecommunications law. The net thus has not been quarantined from restrictions on offline activity such as attempting to personally suborn police/troops or authoring, printing and distributing leaflets calling for the destruction of government buildings, the death of judges and disruption of community services such as water and electricity.

The proposed 2005 federal legislation in Australia for example features offences regarding people who "incite violence against the community", complementing restrictions under the federal Crimes Act and broadcasting and telecommunications legislation.

In France the national government has referred to legislation regarding "inciting harm to people and property over the internet" in detaining bloggers on suspicion of encouraging people to take part in the 2005 Paris riots. One blogger used the unfortunate nom de plume 'sarkodead', a reference to Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy - who had unsurprisingly disparaged the rioters.






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version of November 2005
© Bruce Arnold