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section heading icon     Actors

This page considers the interaction of analysts, brokers, investors and other participants in the 1990s boom.

It covers -

Particular actors are discussed in more detail in the Information Economy guide on this site.

subsection heading icon     introduction

It is traditional to characterise relationships in a bubble as those of the confidence man and his victims. The entrepreneur or broker spruiks investments to stupid (or merely greedy) investors until there is a crisis of confidence and everything ends in tears, with vultures (accountants, lawyers, officials, journalists, other investors) picking over the remains.

In practice is is more effective to consider the dot-com and telco bubbles as the result of interaction between analysts, brokers and financiers, a range of government agencies (including regulators), the media and investors. In other words the bubbles were integral parts of the economy and involved the 'usual suspects', rather than being unprecedented aberrations with a new cast of actors.

A similar interaction will presumably energise future 'irrational exuberance'.

subsection heading icon     the analysts

The bubbles were driven by assessments of innate value, projections of market growth (eg uptake of broadband, wireless and B2C electronic commerce) and forecasts that the price of telco/dot-com stocks would rise as revenue grew and impediments to market increased.

Assessments of current value are contentious. Predicting future value is more of a dark art, reflecting the unavailability of information (or uncertainty about its interpretation) and analyst self interest.

Reshaping of financial services in Australia, the US and elsewhere during the 1980s and 1990s (eg convergence of wholesale and retail banking, substantial deregulation and emphasis on market analysis as a revenue centre in major financial institutions) was reflected in upbeat analysis by

  • accounting firms (which increasingly extended beyond traditional audit activity to embrace the provision of management consulting and even legal services)
  • experts associated with major broking houses
  • consultancies such as Gartner or Jupiter that claimed to offer insights into markets through special access to information, analytical tools or the experience of key staff.

In essence, consumers do not pay analysts to hear that the crystal-ball is murky or that it is advisable to stay out of the market when a boom appears to be underway. The major corporate analysts - and individuals such as Henry Blodgett - thus had an incentive to look on the bright side and, in some instances, to gain media/client attention by badging unexceptional insights with funky prose about imminent developments or sky-high projections.

Metrics specialists - in some cases more appropriately considered as metrics factories - were under similar pressure, responding with oracular statements by gurus ("the death of the web", the rise of "the x-internet"), frequent media releases and research that on close examination was often strikingly thin.

In 2002 major Wall Street houses such as Morgan Stanley agreed to a US$1.4 billion settlement over charges that their analysts published misleading stock research. 'Star' analyst Jack Grubman was accused of changing his rating on AT&T's stock in return for assistance in getting his children into a top Manhattan nursery school. That and other scandals eventually cost Citigroup US$5 billion in fines and court settlements.

The record of many analysts later in the decade was not much better. In Australia Allco Finance Group, ABC Learning Centres and Babcock & Brown were rated "buy" at the start of 2009 by most analysts. By the end of the year Allco and ABC Learning were in receivership, with Babcock is struggling to stay afloat. Its shares had plummeted 99% during the 12 months.

Starting points in considering valuation are Aswath Damodaran's The Dark Side of Valuation (New York: Wiley 2001) and 2000 paper The Dark Side of Valuation: Firms with no Earnings, no History and no Comparables: Can Amazon.com be valued? (PDF), the 2005 paper by William Goetzmann & Ravi Dhar on Bubble Investors: What Were They Thinking? and somewhat disingenuous The Wall Street Self-Defense Manual: A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligent Investing (New York: Atlas Books 2007) by Henry Blodget.


subsection heading icon     financiers and brokers

In introducing this profile we suggested that bubbles reflect the availability of cheap capital and the expectation that investment in a particular sector or enterprise will result in capital growth that is greater than that of the overall economy.

The 1990s bubbles occurred in part because of the availability of venture capital, acceptance of IPOs and the willingness of service providers such as brokers to get enterprises to market and thereafter promote the shares. In retrospect it is clear that some major institutions behaved less than admirably, spruiking particular shares to mum-&-dad investors while offloading their own holdings or accepting inducements for executives that are ethically/legally problematical.

Others appear to a jaundiced observer to have been simply incompetent: despite the best advice that money could supposedly buy 16 of the 17 largest US brokers for example were recommending purchase of Enron shares in September 2001, after that firm had announced an alarming loss of US$600 million.

Daniel Defoe, in The Anatomy of Exchange Alley, accused brokers of practicing "a trade founded in fraud, born in deceit, and nourished by trick, cheat, wheedle, forgeries, falsehoods, and all sorts of delusions''.

Perspectives are provided by Take On The Street (New York: Pantheon 2002) by former SEC chair Arthur Levitt and in The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade (New York: Norton 2003) by überbanker Joseph Stiglitz, who laments that

what happened in the Roaring Nineties was that a set of longstanding checks and balances - a balance between Wall Street, Main Street (or High Street, as it is called in the United Kingdom), and labor; between Old Industry and New Technology, government and the market - was upset, in some essential ways, by the new ascendancy of Finance ... The new mantra was what is good for Goldman Sachs, or Wall Street, is good for America and the world.

Others are found in Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (New York: Times Books 2003) by Frank Partnoy and Blood on the Street: The Sensational Inside Story of How Wall Street Analysts Duped a Generation of Investors (New York: Free Press 2005) by Charles Gasparino, Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst: A True Story of Inside Information and Corruption in the Stock Market (New York: HarperCollins 2006) by Daniel Reingold & Jennifer Reingold, Trading with the Enemy: Seduction & Betrayal on Jim Cramer's Wall Street (New York: HarperBusiness 2002) by Nicholas Maier, How Companies Lie: why Enron is just the tip of the iceberg (New York: Crown 2002) by A Larry Elliott, Buy, lie, and sell: high how investors lost out on Enron and the Internet bubble (London: FT Prentice Hall 2002) by D Quinn Mills, Corporate irresponsibility: Americas newest export (New Haven: Yale Uni Press 2001) by LE Mitchell, Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst: A True Story of Inside Information and Corruption in the Stock Market (New York: HarperCollins 2006) by Dan Reingold and the fashionably retardaire Fat cats and running dogs: the Enron stage of capitalism (London: Zed 2002) by Vijay Prashad.

Reference to works about preceding scandals such as Levine & Co: Wall Street's Insider Trading Scandal (New York: Holt 1987) by Douglas Frantz, Inside Out: An Insider's Account of Wall Street (New York: Putnam 1991) by Dennis Levine, A License to Steal: The Untold Story of Michael Milken and the Conspiracy to Bilk the Nation (New York: Simon & Schuster 1992) by Benjamin Stein suggest that the problem may be inept regulation and human nature rather than the terminal stage of capital, something diagnosed every 20 years since the 1860s.

subsection heading icon     investors

Ultimate responsibility for the dot-com and telco bubbles rests with investors, the people who put their own money into the market (whether directly or through mechanisms such as mutual funds) and who - as voters - have some control over government regulators such as ASIC.

As in past bubbles some investors funded expansion because it seemed like a good idea at the time, because they'd been wowed by noise from the media and their financial advisers or because they'd been lulled by cheering from government.

subsection heading icon     exits

The number of people burned when the dotcom and subprime bubbles collapsed is unknown. One indicator is provided by inventories of litigants in class action against investment advisers.

The mass media have preferred to concentrate on the physical demise of leading figures, including -

  • Adolf Merckle - 74 year old German billionaire (rail)
  • Kirk Stephenson - 47 year old CEO of private equity firm Olivant (rail)
  • René-Thierry Magon de la Villehuchet - 65 year old financier (barbiturates and knife)
  • Patrick Rocca - 41 year old Irish property developer (gunshot)

Crash-related suicide is of course a useful plot device for the removal of figures such as Melmotte.








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