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section heading icon     property

This page offers context by considering real estate bubbles and crashes.

It covers -

It complements the discussion of property values and real estate M&A elsewhere on this site.

subsection heading icon     Japan

The 1980s Japanese real estate bubble is sometimes claimed as the archetypal contemporary bubble in terms of both immediate excess and long term economic impact.

The bubble reflected the success of Japanese manufacturing for export (and the nation's saving regime) in the two decades prior to the Plaza Accord meeting of 22 September 1985 at the Plaza Hotel in New York.

At that meeting the G5 nations agreed to increase the value of the Yen against the US Dollar in order to rebalance US-Japanese trade. By late 1987 the Dollar had ceased falling, settling at around half its value relative to the Yen. That fall meant appreciation of the Yen, allowing Japanese consumers to buy more goodies from overseas (Impressionist paintings, Vuitton bags) and to acquire overseas trophies (landmark office towers in Manhattan, resorts in Hawaii and Queensland).

As imports soared in 1986/7 the Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan, concerned about the impact on domestic manufacturers, reduced interest rates - ultimately down to 2.5%. The conjunction of sustained low interest rates, the hollowing out of industry (particularly SMEs squeezed by major manufacturers) and a history of increasing real estate prices - particularly in major urban centres - encouraged investment in land, increasingly on a speculative basis, and generation of revenue among companies through zaiteku ('financial engineering') rather than manufacturing.

Land values in central Tokyo had increased in every year except two since 1946, with double digit increases since 1983. They tripled in 1986/7 and were forecast to more than triple in the coming decade.

Collapse of the Tokyo stock market and land bubble in 1990 followed back of the envelope calculations that the grounds of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo were worth more than the state of California and that if the Martians could be persuaded to buy Tokyo the residents would be able to buy all of the US, one of those claims that would delight Mackay or other tulip connoisseurs.

Japanese investors lost billions in the collapse at home, with write-downs of inter-company loans and shares, forced consolidation of both major banks (some highlights feature here) and the demise of a range of smaller lenders. In Japan there were 15 years of falling real estate prices.


A 2003 paper (PDF) by the Bank of Japan attributed the bubble to -

  • Aggressive behavior of financial institutions
  • Progress of financial deregulation
  • Inadequate risk management on the part of financial institutions
  • Introduction of the capital accord
  • Protracted monetary easing
  • Taxation and regulations biased toward accelerating the rise in land prices
  • Overconfidence and euphoria
  • Over-concentration of economic functions on Tokyo
  • Tokyo becoming an international financial center

subsection heading icon     perspectives

During that land bubble Japanese corporations and individuals paid premium prices for art works, trophy buildings and golf courses from New York to Los Angeles. In Manhattan for example they acquired US$7.4 billion of real estate over three years ending in 1990, including Rockefeller Center, with an often visceral reaction over the "sale of American patrimony".

The interrelationship of major economies through globalisation was evident in the impact of the Tokyo crash on other economies, with substantial pain in art markets and an initial decline in Manhattan property values. That decline saw Japanese investors lose hundreds of millions of dollars; many of the US buildings found their way back into US hands.

subsection heading icon     studies

Works on Japan include Christopher Wood's The Bubble Economy: The Japanese Economic Collapse (London: Sidgwick & Jackson 1992), Peter Hartcher's The Ministry: How Japan's Most Powerful Institution Endangers World Markets (Boston: Harvard Business School Press 1998).

Aaron Sakolski's The Great American Land Bubble: The amazing story of land-grabbing, speculations, and booms from colonial days to the present time (New York: Harper Bros 1932) and 'Land Speculation and Other Processes in American Historical Geography' by Donald Holtgrieve in The Journal of Geography (1976) suggest that real eastate speculation is as american as apple pie, motherhood and state support for particular vested interests.

For the UK see Alexander Hamilton's 2005 dissertation 'Asset price bubbles and manias: How much was the property boom driven by collective psychology and herding behaviour?'.

The Australian bubble of the 1880s and 1890s is profiled in Cannon, Michael Cannon's The Land Boomers (Carlton: Melbourne Uni Press 1967)




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