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section heading icon     subprime

This page considers the 'subprime crash of 2008', likely to be more significant than the dot-com crash of 2000.


It covers -

subsection heading icon     introduction

By mid-2007 some prescient analysts such as Robert Shiller, George Soros and Peter Hartcher were expressing concern about -

  • systemic problems in lending by financial institutions (particularly home loans in the US to people who were unlikely to be able to repay if there was a major economic downtown or who simply were unlikely to sustain meaningful repayments)
  • the indifference of governments regarding creation of and trade in exotic financial derivatives
  • the unreality of prices in some major mergers & acquisitions
  • the associated unreality of prices in collectibles markets and
  • the apparent incapacity of major regulators such as the US SEC and Australia's APRA.

Those concerns contrasted with upbeat pronouncements from governments, some economic experts and leading financiers. Former US Federal Reserve chair Paul Greenspan for example had told the US Senate Banking Committee that

What we have found over the years in the marketplace is that derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn't be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so. ... We think it would be a mistake to more deeply regulate the contracts

In subsequent years Greenspan repeated mantras about market self-regulation and the inappropriateness of closer supervision of hedge funds, insurers, private equity managers, home financiers and share markets, for example commenting that

Not only have individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.

That reinforced participation by many institutions in what has been dubbed the global 'subprime' bubble, subprime being adventurous loans to US homebuyers.

Injudicious use of derivatives was not the only or even prime danger to financial stability in advanced economies but attracted attention and calls for re-regulation amid a cascade of corporate collapses from March 2008 onwards. The demise of leading institutions such as Lehman Bros, rescue or outright nationalisation of major banks and insurers (including Iceland's four largest banks, the giant AIG insurance conglomerate and Washington Mutual banking conglomerate in the US, the HBOS, Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley in the UK) has led some observers to forecast a global disruption of economic growth approaching that of the 1930s Depression.

subsection heading icon     alternatives

Enthusiasts have sometimes promoted 'alternative investments' as a refuge from financial crashes (with particular classes of assets such as fine art or stamps or even 'e-gold' supposedly being unaffected by unhappiness in share and bond markets), as the basis for risk-free investing (eg diamonds and vintage wine purportedly retain their value irrespective of what happens on the LSE or NYSE) or as a mechanism that magically prevents financial giddiness (eg reliance on a gold-backed currency).

The last weeks of the 2008 subprime crash suggest that such enthusiasm is unrealistic, with indications for example that prices for art - particularly contemporary bling such as pickled sharks and canned ordure - will fall as unfortunate collectors are forced to unload particular items and the market heeds scepticism by figures such as Robert Hughes about the long term value of work by some artists.

subsection heading icon     studies

Macroeconomic studies include The Subprime Solution: How Today's Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It (Princeton: Princeton Uni Press 2008) by Robert Shiller, The Trillion-Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers and the Great Credit Crash (New York: PublicAffairs 2008) by Charles Morris and Supercapitalism: the Battle for Democracy in an Age of Big Business (London: Icon 2008) by Robert Reich. Peter Hartcher's questioning of an icon in Bubble Man: Alan Greenspan and The Missing Seven Trillion (Melbourne: Black Inc 2005) looks increasingly prescient.

Works on particular collapses include The Crunch: the Scandal of Northern Rock and the Escalating Credit Crisis (New York: Random House 2008) by Alex Brummer.

For the 1980s US Savings & Loans crisis see The Thrift Debacle (Berkeley: Uni of California Press 1989) by Ned Eichler, From Buildings and Loans to Bail-Outs: A History of the American Savings and Loan Industry, 1831-1995 (New York: Cambridge Uni Press 2004) by David Mason, Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans (New York: McGraw-Hill 1989) by Stephen Pizzo, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry (New York: Scribner 1990) by Martin Mayer, The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal: How an Unholy Alliance of Politics and Money Destroyed America's Banking System (New York: Wiley 1990) by James Adams, Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues (New York: Basic Books 1986) by Irvine Sprague, High Rollers: Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle (New York: Praeger 1991) by Martin Lowy, Other People's Money: The Inside Story of the S&L Mess (New York: Simon & Schuster 1989) by Paul Pilzer and S&L Hell: The People and the Politics Behind the $1 Trillion Savings and Loan Scandal (New York: Norton 1993) by Kathleen Day.



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