| overview
 orientation
 
 tulips
 
 steam age
 
 jazz & plastic
 
 property
 
 fleece
 
 inflections
 
 snapshot
 
 dotcoms
 
 telcos
 
 peaks
 
 au bubble
 
 actors
 
 media
 
 fiction
 
 accounting
 
 regulators
 
 clean-ups
 
 bubble 2.0?
 
 sinobubble
 
 subprime
 
 landmarks
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  related
 Guides:
 
 Economy
 
 Governance
 
 Networks
 
 eCapital
 
 
 
 
 
 
 |  regulators 
 This page considers public and private sector regulators.
 
 It covers -
 
                        introductionframeworksgovernmentprivate  regulators 
 In some sense we are all Thatcher's children, affected 
                        by the deregulatory zeitgeist of the 1980s and 1990s. 
                        Part of the excess of speculative investment in dot-coms 
                        and telcos is attributable to reliance on self-regulation 
                        by financial markets. It is also attributable to the weakness 
                        of government regulators in the US, Germany, Australia 
                        and elsewhere.
 
 In retrospect agencies such as Australia's ASIC took too 
                        positive a view of those they supposed to regulate. In 
                        some cases, such as insurance sector regulation by the 
                        Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) the 
                        lack of will appears to have been compounded by lack of 
                        expertise and resources, resulting in the HIH, 
                        OneTel, Froggy.com and Enron debacles.
 
 Blame must be shared with private sector financial service 
                        providers, in particular global groups such as as Arthur 
                        Andersen that had expanded from audit activity to embrace 
                        management consulting and even legal advice. Critics have 
                        noted the 'expectations gap', rediscovered every decade. 
                        Investors appear to believe the accountants 
                        are supposed to stop fraud. Accountants refuse to accept 
                        that responsibility, arguing that their task is not to 
                        suspect that management is lying but simply to make sure 
                        that the data — whose accuracy is the responsibility 
                        of boards and managers responsibility — is presented 
                        in a manner consistent with accounting convention.
 
 In the US the 'big five' - PricewaterhouseCoopers (US$2.2 
                        billion turnover in 2000), KMPG (US$1.3bn), Deloitte Touche 
                        Tohmatsu (US$1.2bn), Ernst&Young (US$1bn) and Arthur 
                        Andersen (US$0.9bn) - were belatedly found wanting by 
                        the SEC and other agencies. As noted on the preceding 
                        page, Andersen appears to have made more money from providing 
                        management advice to Enron than underpinning corporate 
                        compliance through rigorous independent audit services.
 
 Insights are provided by Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting 
                        Values, Unexpected Consequences (New York: Prentice 
                        Hall 2003) by Susan Squires, Cynthia Smith, William Yeack 
                        & Lorna McDougall, Paul Barry's Rich Kids (Sydney: 
                        Bantam 2002), Maggie Mahar's Bull! A History of the 
                        Boom, 1982-1999 (New York: HarperBusiness 2004), 
                        Jean Gadrey's New Economy, New Myth (London: 
                        Routledge 2003), Pump And Dump: The Rancid Rules of 
                        the New Economy (New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni Press 
                        2005) by Robert Tillman & Michael Indergaard and Icarus 
                        in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America 
                        and Where They Came From (New York: Oxford Uni Press 
                        2005) by David Skeel.
  other government agencies 
 Government regulatory action was sometimes contested by 
                        other government agencies. One of the products of notions 
                        of 'internet exceptionalism' and 'policy by media release' 
                        was the establishment of 'new economy' agencies such as 
                        Australia's National Office for the Information Economy.
 
 The effectiveness of such agencies in facilitating uptake 
                        of the net by business and the wider community or driving 
                        the development of coherent whole-of-government policies 
                        is uncertain. Most appear to have succumbed to hubris, 
                        serving as cheerleaders and distinguished by publishing 
                        of glossy reports rather than much of substance, offering 
                        legitimacy to media noise about the unendable boom.
 
 Comparison of the 'digital' cheerleaders with other government 
                        new technology facilitators (such as those in the biotechnology 
                        sector concerned with policy-making and funding) is instructive. 
                        We'll be exploring the performance of the digital agencies 
                        and biotech agencies in a forthcoming paper.
 
 Other parts of government, such as agencies responsible 
                        for auction of radiofrequency spectrum to mobile phone 
                        companies, were also fundamental actors in the bubbles.
 
 
 
 
 
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                        (clean-ups) 
  
                        
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